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AS FRIENDS AND RIVALS:
EUROPEAN UNION LAW IN GLOBAL ECONOMIC NETWORKS
FRANCIS SNYDER *
1. Introduction
Globalisation and europeanisation are  complementary, partly
overlapping,  mutually reinforcing, but also competing processes.
This paper explores their dialectical relationship by examining some
aspects of European Union (EU) law that are integral to global
economic networks, especially but not only those linking  the EU
and China.
The purpose of the paper is two-fold. First, the paper seeks to bring
out into the open various legal arrangements which create, channel,
structure, or express some of the most important economic
relations involved in globalisation. It focuses on selected aspects of
EU law and certain types of global economic networks.1 The
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1 This paper is one of a series of related publications. See also: Francis
Snyder, ‘Legal Aspects of Trade between the European Union and China:
Preliminary Reflections’, in Nicholas Emiliou and David O’Keeffe (ed), The
European Union and World Trade Law after the GATT Uruguay Round (John
Wiley & Sons, Chichester, 1996), pp 363-377; Francis Snyder, International
7aspects of EU law in question are highly technical rules of customs
and international trade law known as inward processing and
outward processing. They rarely see the light of day and are
virtually unknown except within the business community, institutions
of governance, and a handful of specialist lawyers. Global
economic networks are more well-known, at least among
economists and political scientists; but lawyers have so far paid
them very little attention. This paper tries to make such material
accessible and to pry open some of the broader issues it raises. It
seeks to demonstrate that both the extremely technical customs
rules and the international economic relations which have
developed in conjunction with and around them are directly relevant
to current debates about EU law. My basic argument is that we
cannot understand the interests, structures, and processes involved
in European integration today without taking global economic
networks into account.
Second, and correlatively, the paper aims to introduce the theme of
globalisation into current debates concerning the EU constitution.
On the one hand, globalisation both reinforces and strengthens the
demand for the constitutionalisation f EU decision-making, On the
                                                                                                  
Trade and Customs Law of the European Union (Butterworths, London,
1998), pp 594-600 and passim [hereafter Snyder, International Trade],
Francis Snyder, ‘Global Economic Networks and Global Legal Pluralism’, in
George Bermann, Matthias Herdegen, and Peter Lindseth (eds),
Transatlantic Regulatory Co-operation (Oxford University Press, 2000, in
press) [hereafter Snyder, ‘Global Legal Pluralism]; Francis Snyder,
‘Governing Globalisation’, (1999) 5 European Law Journal, Special Issue on
‘Globalisation and Law’, forthcoming [hereafter Snyder, ‘Governing
Globalisation’]; Francis Snyder, ‘Legal Issues in EU-China Trade Relations’,
Wuhan University Law Review, forthcoming 1999 [in Chinese]; and Francis
8other hand, it tends to reconfigure conomic relations and undercut
potential political alliances which otherwise might encourage the
constitutionalisation of Europe. I suggest that, on balance,
globalisation tends to retard or even prevent the marriage of
europeanisation and constitutionalisation, at least if we take
‘constitutionalisation’ to mean the elaboration, both legally and in
terms of social practices, of a constitutional structure analogous to
that of nation-states. For not only is it true that the development of
global economic networks – a key economic aspect of globalisation
-  has, and will continue to have, a profound effect on the
constitutionalisation of Europe. It is also the case, as this paper
argues, that the form and content of the Europeanisation of law
have stimulated and enhanced certain types of global economic
relations which, though promoted by the EU and many of its
Member States, tend to undercut the process of EU constitution-
building.
Far from being a negative, destructive exercise, however, this
opens up a space for and shows the necessity of a different
constitutional imagination. The paper thus is a plea for a re-thinking
and reorientation of EU constitutional law scholarship, one which
takes fully into account he impact of globalisation. Or, to put it
more positively, the argument of the paper takes place on two
different levels. It is explicitly concerned with the role of EU law in
global economic networks as part of the processes of globalisation
and europeanisation. Its implicit message, however, is that we as
legal scholars and citizens need to use our constitutional
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9imagination and envisage a distinctive EU constitution, one which
takes these processes serious and thus differs significantly from the
traditional model of the nation-state.
The remainder of the paper is divided into six main parts. Part 2
defines the concept of globalisation used here and sketches the
main features of certain types of global economic networks. Parts 3
through 6 consider the basic arrangements in EU law which foster,
structure, channel and seek to manage these economic
relationships. Part 4 sets forth the basic legal framework of inward
processing and outward processing. Part 5 discusses a selection of
trade disputes involving inward processing or outward processing
that have come before the European Court of Justice. Part 6
considers some aspects of the relationship between inward
processing, outward processing, and anti-dumping. The general
trade disputes are discussed first because they are easier to
understand: they tend to be simpler than the anti-dumping disputes
in terms of facts, legal concepts, and applicable law. This way of
organising the material also presents the disputes involving inward
processing and outward processing in roughly chronological order.
It thus illustrates more clearly the development of inward
processing and outward processing and their dramatic impact on
EU law. The reader thus can appreciate easily the dialectial
relationship between globalisation and europeanisation. A brief
conclusion summarises the argument and its implications.
                                                                                                  
(Peking University Press, Beijing, forthcoming 2000 [in Chinese]).
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2. Globalisation and Global Economic Networks
What do we mean by 'globalisation'? By globalisation, I refer to an
aggregate of  multifaceted, uneven,  often contradictory economic,
political, social and cultural processes which are characteristic of
our time.
In economic terms, the most salient features of globalisation, driven
by multinational firms, are for the present purposes the
development of international production networks (IPNs),2
dispersion of production facilities among different countries, the
technical and functional fragmentation of production, the
fragmentation of ownership, the flexibility of the production process,
worldwide sourcing, an increase in intra-firm trade, the
interpenetration of international financial markets, the possibility of
virtually instantaneous worldwide flows of information, changes in
the nature of employment, and the emergence of new forms of
work.  Globalisation also has political, social, and cultural
dimensions.3 Here, however, I focus on the economic dimension.
Among the key economic aspects of globalisation are global
economic networks. These cross-national production networks
involve 'the organization across national borders of research and
development activities, procurement, distribution, product definition
                                  
2 See e.g. Michael Borrus and John Zysman, 'Globalisation with Borders: The
Rise of Wintelism as the Future of Industrial Competition', in John Zysman
and Andrew Schwartz (eds), Enlarging Europe: The Industrial Foundations of
a New Political Reality (University of California at Berkeley, Berkeley, 1998),
pp 27-59.
3 This is based on a more complete definition set forth in Francis Snyder,
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and design, manufacturing, and support service'.4 Their basic
features include the fragmentation of production, the dispersion of
production facilities, worldwide sourcing, and intra-firm trade.
This paper focuses on the customs operations known in EU law as
the inward processing procedure and the outward processing
procedure. Put simply, the inward processing procedure allows
firms to import into the EU materials for processing in the EU
without paying custom duties. The outward processing procedure
allows materials to exported temporarily for processing and the
resulting products to be re-imported with partial or total relief from
duties. In this section of the paper, I consider these operations from
the economic standpoint. I refer to these economic operations as
‘inward processing traffic’ (IPT) and ‘outward processing traffic’
(OPT), respectively, to distinguish them from the customs
procedures. Viewed as economic relationships, IPT and OPT
represent one of the organisational forms of international production
networks; other forms are branch plant production, contract
manufacture and original equipment manufacture, and vertical
integration.5 Both in Central and Eastern Europe and in Asia, they
                                                                                                  
‘Global Legal Pluralism’.
4 This definition has been elaborated in the publications of the Berkeley
Roundtable on the International Economy (BRIE). See e.g. E.M. Doherty (ed)
Japanese Investment in Asia: International Production Strategies in a Rapidly
Changing World (University of California at Berkeley, -BRIE, 1995); John
Zysman and Andrew Schwartz (eds), Enlarging Europe: The Industrial
Foundations of a New Political Reality (University of California at Berkeley,
1998).
5 See T. Sturgeon, 'Does Manufacturing Still Matter?: The Organizational
Delinking of Production from Innovation', BRIE Working Paper 92B, Berkeley
Roundtable on the International Economy, University of California at
Berkeley, 1997, and T. Sturgeon, 'The Rise of the Global Locality: Turnkey
Production Networks in Electronics Manufacturing', University of California at
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have often been a step leading toward the development of complex,
capital-intensive cross-national production networks.6
International production networks increasingly involve not just inter-
industry or inter-firm but also intra-industry and intra-firm trade.
Neither intra-industry nor intra-firm trade is wholly new, at least
between industrialised countries.7 In recent decades, however, both
intra-industry and intra-firm trade have increased dramatically with
the growth of multinational companies. According to recent
estimates, intra-firm trade now accounts for approximately 60% of
international trade. In fact, in its 1996 Communication on 'The
Global Challenge of International Trade', the European
Commission noted that globalisation and increased trade
liberalisation imply increased networking among companies,
increased intra-firm trade in manufactures, and global resourcing
with regard to research, development, and production facilities.
Furthermore, in its view, '[o]utward processing trade using local
advantages for lowering production costs or the logistics of
distribution systems is turning even medium-sized companies into
global players'.8
                                                                                                  
Berkeley, forthcoming, 1998; both cited in John Zysman and Andrew
Schwartz, 'Reunifying Europe in an Emerging World Economy: Economic
Heterogeneity, New Industrial Options, and Political Choices', (1998) 36
Journal of Common Market Studies 405 at  410-411 [hereafter Zysman and
Schwartz, ‘Reunifying Europe’].
6'Reunifying Europe’ at  417.
7 See H G Grubel and P J Lloyd, Intra-Industry Trade: The Theory and
Measurement of International Trade in Differentiated Products (London,
Macmillan, 1975).
8 European Commission, 'The Global Challenge of International Trade: A
Market Access Strategy for the European Union' (Communication to the
Council, the European Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee, and
the Committee of Regions), COM(96)53 final, 14.2.96, p 1 (para 4), available
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The EU, its Member States, and firms based there are involved in a
wide variety of IPT and OPT operations. From the EU standpoint,
such links between the EU and other industrialised countries, such
as the USA, involve mainly inward processing. In 1996 the
European Commission published a report on inward processing.9
Table I indicates the increasing use of IPT between 1988 and 1994,
the last year of available statistics.
                                                                                                  
on the Internet at website <http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/dg01/en.htm.>
9 Commission Européenne, ‘Rapport sur le Fonctionnement et l'Avenir du
Regime Douanier Economique du Perfectionnement Actif’ (Commission
Europeenne: DG XXI ,1996).
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Table 1
Inward Processing in the EU, 1988-1994
YEAR
TOTAL INWARD
PROCESSING
in 1000 ecu
1988  20,959,603
1989  28,714,720
1990  27,725,170
1991  30,840,191
1992  21,467,345
1993  31,627,016
1994  36,997,799
TOTAL 198,331,845
Source:  Commission Européenne, 'Rapport sur le fonctionnement et l'avenir
du régime douanier écconomique du perfectionnement actif', XXX/1073/96-
Fr., pp 13.
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Trade between the EU and the Central and Eastern European
countries (CEECs) frequently involves OPT. Most of the few
existing empirical studies of EU IPT and OPT concern the use by
EU firms of OPT in the CEECs.10 They have shown that OPT
represents one type of international division of labour and that it
frequently provides the basis for more complex forms of IPNs. They
have also argued that the ways in which production facilities located
in the CEECs are inserted into IPNs centred in the EU are likely to
be of crucial importance to European regional integration.
We can add a further dimension by referring briefly to trade
between the EU and China. Such trade often involves links
between the EU and the Chinese Special Economic Zones
(SEZs),11 even though such zones are not yet standardized and
apparently are not generally recognised by international law.12 IPT
and OPT are crucial for trade between Hong Kong and Chinese
inland areas, and hence for re-exports from Hong Kong to the EU
                                  
10 See Julie Pellerin, International Business and the European Integration
Process: The Example of Outward Processing Traffic between the European
Union and the Central and Eastern European Countries, Unpublished PhD
Thesis, Department of Social and Political Sciences, European University
Institute, July 1997 [hereafter P llegrin, International Business]‘; Zysman and
Schwartz, 'Reunifying Europe; John Zysman and Andrew Schwartz (eds),
Enlarging Europe: The Industrial Foundations of a New Political Reality
(University of California at Berkeley, Berkeley, 1998) [hereafter Enlarging
Europe].
11 See e.g. Nicholas R Lardy, China in the World Economy (Institute for
International Economics, Washington, DC, 1994), pp 112-114 Dieter Loesch,
‘Chinese Special Economic Zones at a Crossroads’, HWWA-Institut fuer
Wirtschaftsforschung-Hamburg, HWWA-Diskussionspapier Nr. 25, 1995.
12 See Sun Xiuping, Chen Wen and Lei  Xianseng,  New Progress in China's
Special Economic Zones (Foreign Languages Press, Beijing, 1997), p 54.
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as well as for direct exports from mainland China to the EU.13
Special economic zones and other export processing zones are not
of course unique to China. They exist in many other parts of the
world, and there is even a World Export Processing Zones
Association (WEPZA) with its own Internet website.14
In this instance, as in others, the most significant elements from the
standpoint of EU strategic actors, which are usually the large firms,
are where the production process starts and whether the company
intends to export the product once the product is already in the EU.
From the EU standpoint, inward processing means that production
starts in the third country, the product is processed further in the
EU, and the product then is exported to a third country, either where
the production process started or another country. From the same
EU standpoint, outward processing means that production starts in
the EU, further processing takes place elsewhere, and the product
is intended in principle for the EU market.15 To this perspective
must be added the home country of the firms concerned, either in
the EU or elsewhere, because this determines many of the other
interests which affect and are affected by the operations of strategic
actors.
                                  
13 As of the first quarter of 1997, 48% (US $6.6 billion) of Hong Kong's total
exports to Chinese inland areas were for outward processing. During the
same period, outward processing contributed to 75% (US $12.5 billion) of
Hong Kong's imports from the inland areas. Also during this period, 85% (US
$15.6 billion) of Hong Kong's re-exports of origin from Chinese inland
provinces were related to outward processing. (source: Press Releases on
Statistical Data, Statistics on Trade Involving Outward Processing in China,
http://www.info.gov.hk/censtatd/hkstat/press/t7idx.htm.)
14 WEPZA is based in Flagstaff, Arizona, USA. See its website at
http://www.wepza.com.
15 I am grateful to Candido Garcia Molyneux for these points.
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IPT and OPT are often associated with intra-industry trade (IIT).
Intra-industry trade now dominates North-North trade, or trade
between industrialised countries. However, there are few studies of
IIT with respect to economies in transition and relatively little easily
accessible information on China.16 This represents a striking
lacunae in view of the significance of OPT/IPT in EU-China trade
and the fact that these economic relationships are involved in many
of the numerous EU anti-dumping actions against China.
One recent study, however, deals with intra-industry trade (IIT)
between China and the OECD countries, including but not limited to
the EU.17  It concluded, first, that IIT between China and OECD
countries increased moderately during the 1980s and rapidly
thereafter. By the late 1980s it was approximately 20% of total
PRC-OECD trade.
Second,  IIT is most important in certain product groups, such as
chemicals and related products, manufactured goods, and
machinery and transport equipment. It is of less importance in
respect of miscellaneous manufactured goods. For this product
                                  
16 But see, e.g., Chung H. Lee and Helmut Reisen (eds), From Reform to
Growth: China and Other Countries in Transition in Asia and Central and
Eastern Europe (OECD Development Centre Documents, Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development, Paris, 1994); Francoise Lemoine,
‘Trade Policy and Trade Patterns during Transition: A Comparison between
China and the CEECs’, Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations
Internationales (CEPII), Document de Travail No. 96-02, février 1996.
17 Lisbeth Hellvin, 'Vertical Intra-Industry Trade between China and the
OECD Countries', OECD Development Centre, Technical Papers No. 114,
July 1996 [hereafter Hellvin, ‘Vertical Intra-Industry Trade’].
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group, it accounts for only about 4% of trade,18 even though the
product group accounts for about 67% of total manufacturing
exports from China (but only about 5% of total manufacturing
imports, part because of high tariffs).19   
Third, IIT between China and OECD countries is primarily vertical in
nature,  while IIT among OECD countries is mainly horizontal in
nature.20  In other words, China tends to export lower quality
varieties in exchange for higher quality varieties in a large share of
the PRC-OECD IIT volume. 21 This is consistent with recent reports
on the structure of traded goods between the EU and China.
Figures for 1994 show that 60% of EU imports from China consist
of textiles and clothing (20%), mechanical/electrical machinery
(30%), and toys, leather goods and footwear (20%), while 60% of
EU exports to China consist of mechanical/electrical machinery,
transport equipment, and nuclear reactors.22
                                  
18 Hellvin, ‘Vertical Intra-Industry Trade’, p 28.
19 Hellvin, ‘Vertical Intra-Industry Trade’, p 15.
20 'Horizontal intra-industry trade is trade in varieties of a product
characterised by different attributes, while vertical intra-industry trade is trade
in varieties of a product characterised by different quali ies' . The former
typically occurs between countries with high and similar per capita incomes,
while the latter typically occurs between cou ries at different levels of per
capita income: Hellvin, ‘Vertical Intra-Industry Trade’, p 18.
21 Note that the study used unit price as a proxy for quality differences:
Hellvin, ‘Vertical Intra-Industry Trade’,  p 22. This is based however on the
assumption of the 'open economy macroeconomic model' which presumes
that international prices apply (or should apply) in China. For a critique of this
assumption, see Willem van der Geest, 'Bringing China into the Concert of
Nations: An Analysis of its Accession to the WTO', (!998) 32 Journal of World
Trade 99 at 105-106.
22 See the Internet homepage of the European Commission Delegation in
China at http://www.ecd.org.cn.
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Fourth,  there is a wide variation in IIT shares among different
OECD countries. If we consider only the EU Member States, the
order in 1992 was UK, Italy, Germany, France, Netherlands,
Benelux, Ireland, Spain, Sweden, Austria, Denmark, Portugal and
Greece.23
Fifth, tariff barriers in China tend to reduce the IIT component of its
trade with OECD countries.
These findings suggest that, with increased market opening,
increased foreign direct investment (FDI), and increased per capita
income, there is likely to be an increase in intra-industry trade, and
in particular horizontal intra-industry trade, between China and the
OECD countries. This would be consistent with Cantwell's
presentation (see Table 2) of the evolution of international
production and the development of intra-firm trade and intra-
industry trade.
                                  
23 Lisbeth Hellvin, 'Vertical Intra-Industry Trade’, p 16, Table 2.
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Table 2
     The Evolution of International Production
and the Development of Intra-Firm and Intra-Industry Trade
TYPE OF INTERNATIONAL
PRODUCTION
COMPOSITION OF MNC
TRADE
Resource-based production Intra-firm, inter-industry trade
Local market-
oriented production
Some intra-firm, intra-industry
trade
Internationally integrated
production
Intra-firm and intra-industry
trade
Source: John Cantwell, 'The Relationship between International Trade and
International Production', in David Greenaway and L. Alan Winters (eds)
Surveys in International Trade, Blackwell, Oxford, 1994), pp 303-328 at p
308, Table 11.1.
21
These forms of globalisation do not have equal effects on all EU
Member States. As shown in Table 3, some Member States made
much more use of inward processing than others.
22
Table 3
Use of Inward Processing by Member State (EC-11), 1966-1994
MEMBER STATE
TOTAL USE,1988-1994,
in 1000 ecu
Belgium and
Luxembourg
10,538,146
Denmark   3,919,567
France  43,642,981
Germany  32,773,550
Greece    2,348,185
Ireland    6,630,856
Italy  20,374,496
Netherlands  22,872,909
Portugal    1,941,987
Spain    9,819,675
United Kingdom  43,469,493
Source:  Commission Européenne, 'Rapport sur le fonctionnement et l'avenir
du régime douanier écconomique du perfectionnement actif', XXX/1073/96-
Fr., pp 14-15.
23
We may complete the picture, at least for the present purposes, by
noting that the volume of trade with China, both imports and
exports, varies widely from one EU Member State to another. Table
4 gives statistics for January-December 1995, the most recent
annual figures available.
24
Table 4
Trade between the EU and its Member States and China,
January-December 1995
(in millions of ECU)
Imports from
China
Exports to
China
Balance
France 3094 2028 -1066
Belgium and
Luxembourg
1516 674 -842
Netherlands 1908 635 -1273
Germany 8966 5699 -2367
Ireland 3044 2061 943
United Kingdom
4551 957 -3594
Ireland 207 28 -179
Denmark 567 200 -367
Greece 288 13 -275
Portugal 151 26 -125
Spain 1454 658 -796
Sweden 827 852 +25
Finland 250 440 +190
Austria 450 331 -119
EU-15 26333 14602 -11731
Source: Home Page of the European Commission Delegation in China,
http://www.ecd.org.cn/ecd/trad/ , as of 14.1.99, based on Eurostat.
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It is true that, as Cantwell argues, '[t]he major regions are
becoming linked to one another more by international production
than by trade.' 24 However, it is also the case that, once we examine
these economic relations in national (or even local) rather than
regional terms, there is a great diversity and unevenness in the
extent to which particular EU Member States (and localities) are
linked to other regions and sub-regional areas through international
production as well as trade.
An even more differentiated picture emerges if we consider these
links in terms of firms rather than in terms of the territories which we
usually associate with state governance structures, and
consequently with the classical view of international [inter-national]
trade. For example, the Commission report on inward processing
shows that inward processing procedure is used mainly by large
firms, not small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). This is the
case even though the latter comprise 93% of all EU  firms and
account for one-third of all employees.  SMEs thus are extremely
important in the EU economy as compared to the USA, where
enterprises with fewer than 20 employees account for only 20% of
employees, and large firms employ 61% of the work force and
account for 61% of business turnover.25 Yet they occupy a
disproportionately small role in the global economic networks of IPT
and OPT.
                                  
24 John Cantwell, 'The Relationship between International Trade and
International Production', in David Greenaway and L. Alan Winters (eds)
Surveys in International Trade, Blackwell, Oxford, 1994), pp 303-328 at p 320
[hereafter Cantwell, ‘The Relationship’].
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As a working hypothesis, it may therefore be suggested that the
interests of SMEs thus lie frequently in protecting their domestic
markets, if necessary by anti-dumping duties. The interests of large
firms involved in global economic networks, however, lie in
maintaining inward processing procedures and outward processing
procedures as unfettered as possible. Seen from this perspective,
anti-dumping on the one hand and IPT and OPT on the other hand
deal with two distinct channels of imports.They compete with each
other, partly because each tends to be occupied by firms that differ
in their degree of participation in global economic networks. The
resulting two groups of firms, and the EU Member States which
defend them, thus have conflicting interests with regard to EU trade
policy and the deployment of trade policy instruments. These
hypotheses remain to be tested by further research.
3. Globalisation,  Europeanisation, and EU Law
EC law on inward processing and outward processing bears a
complex relationship to the processes of Europeanisation and
globalisation. Both are different responses to trade barriers. If there
were no trade barriers, such as tariffs or quotas, there would be no
demand or need for IPT or OPT, in the sense of specific legal
customs regimes.
National legislation permitting OPT preceded EC legislation.
Originally OPT was 'a national response to the globalisation of
                                                                                                  
25 Cantwell, ‘The Relationship’, p 38, including note 1.
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production activity in certain sectors’.26 It was stimulated by the
search by firms for lower production costs, in particular for labour.
Certain national governments responded to the demands of firms
by creating a specific customs regime that favoured the
internationalisation of production.
Subsequently, the europeanisation of the OPT regime was 'a
response to  the internationalisation of firms' strategies adopted by
national governments in order to recapture political control over
growing economic interdependence'.27 The EC (mainly the
Commission) sought to capture political control of the
internationalisation of production via OPT by means of the law. By
pushing for the creation the customs categories of inward
processing and outward processing in EC law, it sought to
europeanise the legal control of OPT, in other words, to shift the
locus of control of globalising firms and the development of global
economic networks from the Member States to the European
Community.
The europeanisation of IPT and OPT, which in this case meant EC
legal harmonisation, is relatively recent. If we take the case of OPT,
there have long been two types of OPT, one providing partial or
total suspension of quotas and involving mainly textiles and clothing
(economic OPT), and the other providing partial or total suspension
of tariffs and concerning other sectors (tariff OPT). Initially the
former was managed by the Member States and the latter by the
                                  
26 Pellegrin, International Business, p 157.
27 Pellegrin, International Business, p 11.
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Community. A 1975 EC directive28 applied to both. The first
Community regulation on OPT29 applied only to tariff OPT, and the
more controversial economic OPT was first regulated by the
Community only in 1982.30 The latter and a subsequent 1994
regulation, which is currently in force, were both attempts to
harmonise the national OPT regimes. Today, in addition, IPT and
OPT are exempted from quotas, for example for imports into the
EU of textiles from China.31
As institutional strategy and economic policy, however, the
europeanisation of law in these matters has not been
straightforward or free from conflict. For the European institutions,
as for certain national governments, the creation and control of
these customs procedures was an institutional and organisational
response to globalisation. The EU and the Member States (despite
conflicts between Member States) were frequently competitors.
Both sought to govern, through their respective laws, the global
economic networks which were developing as part of  (and indeed
stimulated) the process of globalisation. Just as demands for these
customs procedures were a response, mainly by large firms, to
economic globalisation in the face of trade barriers, so the law
establishing and regulating these procedures represented attempts
by different, and often competing, systems of governance to
                                  
28 Council Directive 76/119, OJ 30.1.76 L24/1.
29 Council Regulation 2473/86, OJ 2.8.86 L212/1.
30 Council Regulation 636/82, OJ 20.3.82 L76/1.
31 See Agreement on trade in textile products covered by the MFA
Agreement, arts. 4(1), 4(4), OJ 31.12.88 L380/2 (MFA textiles); Agreement on
trade in textile products not covered by the MFA bilateral agreement, arts.
4(1), 4(4), OJ 6.5.95 L104/2 (non-MFA textiles, especially silk and linen). See
further Snyder, International Trade, pp 417-419, 596-599.
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regulate the economic relations and capture the political benefits of
globalisation.32
Furthermore, the political attempts to govern these economic
aspects of globalisation through law has involved conflicts both
between the EC and the Member States as a group and among the
Member States themselves. Both the demand for and the use of
these customs procedures has varied among firms and thus from
one Member State to another. These factors played a fundamental
role in shaping conflicts regarding the creation of these customs
procedures, first by national law, and then by EC legislation. The
conflicts regarding EC law concerned not only the details of
legislation, but also the very process of the europeanisation of this
body of law, which harmonised, often transformed, and always
replaced the previous national legislation.
It is not surprising, therefore, that the europeanisation of law
concerning inward processing and outward processing has not
been entirely successful, at least if the main criterion for judging
success is the degree of effective control over global economic
networks. Member States, largely at the instigation of firms, were
able, as Pellegrin shows, to negotiate the bits and pieces of EC
OPT legislation so as largely to preserve the interests of these
firms. The process of europeanisation in the sense of the
harmonisation of national legislation thus was uneven, and the
governance of OPT was not very effectively centralised.33 As this
example suggests, the europeanisation of law is rarely
                                  
32 See also Pellegrin, International Business, passim.
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straightforward, and it is also not always entirely successful,
whether measured in terms of centralisation or or harmonisation.
In addition, the contribution of IPT and OPT to the process of
europeanisation in ways other than the elaboration of legislation
has also been uneven. The basic assumption, as Pellegrin
emphasises with regard to OPT between the EU and the CEECs,
was that territory, political competence, governance, and economic
activity were congruent. EC OPT law thus represented 'an attempt
to transpose the national model of market management at the
Community level'.34  In fact, however, the contribution of OPT to
regional integration has varied a great deal, not only according to
sector but also according to the production network involved.35
The governance of globalisation in this instance tends to refract in a
complex way the internal EU constitution. The EC law on inward
processing and outward processing mirrors to some extent the
division of power between the Member States and the EC. Rarely,
however, does law reflect politics directly. In this instance EC law
was a product of a specific process of europeanisation, occurring
over a period of time and involving particular interests and specific
relations between firms, states, and EC institutions. The
governance through law of globalisation in this sense shifted in
form from the Member States to the Community. But many of the
pre-existing conflicts remained, and were represented and even
crystallised in the details of the legislation. The different interests of
                                                                                                  
33 Pellegrin, International Business, passim.
34 Pellegrin, International Business, p 8.
35 See also Zysman and Schwartz (eds), Enlarging Europe.
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the Member States, and in turn those of the firms which they
represented to some extent in the legislative process, have been
articulated in terms of Community law. They were partly preserved
in the substance, though not in the form, of Community law.36
One may also hypothesise that europeanisation of IPT and OPT
law, in the sense of a shift in the locus of decision-making and law-
making, tended to strengthen the ties between each Member State
and the firms based, or located principally, within its territory. Such
ties may have been more loose, and subject to other pressures,
when the applicable law was national law. It is likely that the
process and the results of the europeanisation of IPT and OPT law
sharped conflicts of interest between Member States.
4. Inward Processing and Outward Processing in EU Law
The fragmentation of production, the dispersion of production
facilities, worldwide sourcing, and intra-firm trade thus have
developed in a symbiotic relationship with certain legal categories
and concepts. IPT and OPT are intimately linked to the EC customs
procedures of inward processing and outward processing  The
same terms (IPT and OPT), or virtually the same terms (inward
professing traffic [IPT] and outward processing traffic [OPT]; inward
processing procedure and outward processing procedure), refer at
one and the same time to economic relationships and to the legal
                                  
36 For a similar example, see Francis Snyder, New Directions in European
Community Law (Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, 1990), pp.146-176,
especially 171.
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labels, pigeonholes or customs devices which facilitate their
creation and maintenance. This economic dimension of
globalisation and these legal categories of customs law are
symbiotic: each owes its existence to some extent to the other, and
each feeds on and thrives to some extent because of the other.
This section and the following two sections of the paper consider
inward processing and outward processing from the standpoint of
EC law.
In terms of current EC law,37 inward processing is the system
whereby imported goods may be processed  in the EC customs
territory without giving rise to liability for payment of customs duties,
or other commercial policy measures, if the goods are intended for
export outside the customs territory of the Community in the form of
compensating products.38 Use of the procedure is subject to certain
conditions, which in principle are designed to ensure that IPT does
not harm unduly the interests of EU-based producers. This
arrangement is designed to promote exports from EU firms and
foster the international division of labour, but without adversely
affecting the essential interests of Community producers.39
                                  
37 For further detail, see Snyder, International Trade, Chapter 5.
38 Council Regulation 2913/92, Art 114(1),  O.J. 19.10.92 L302/1). As to the
processing operations allowed under the inward processing procedure, s e
ibid, Article 114 (2)(c). The implementing Commission Regulation (EEC)
2454/93,  OJ 11.10.93 L253/1, defines the main compensating products in
Article 549(a) and the secondary compensating products in Art. 549(b).
Losses and operators are defined in Arts. 549(c) and 549(e), respectively, of
this Commission Regulation.  The following discussion presents only a
skeleton outline of inward processing.
39 See Case 260/78, Maggi GmbH v Hauptzollamt Munster, [1979] ECR
2693.
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There are two basic procedures. Under the suspension system,
non-EU goods intended for re-export from the EU in the form of
compensating products may be imported duty-free: customs duties
are suspended. Use of this system can be authorised only if the
applicant actually intends to re-export the main compensating
products from the EU customs territory. Under the drawback
system, normal customs duties are paid but then the exporter can
request their repayment or remission if the imported products are
re-exported in the form of compensating products. Authorisation to
use the drawback system is granted only where opportunities exist
for export of the main compensating products from the EU customs
territory. Export duties may be exempted under the suspension
system but not under the drawback system.
The basic theme of inward processing is also subject to four more
complex variations. The first variation concerns processing
operations outside the Community customs territory. Imported
goods in their unaltered state, or their compensating goods, can be
exported temporarily for the purpose of further processing outside
the customs territory of the Community.40 This is possible only,
however, after the customs authorities grant authorisation in
accordance with the rules provided for outward processing.41 Under
the drawback system, the  temporary exportation  of compensating
products will not be considered as exportation for the purposes of
repayment or remission of the import duties initially paid except
                                  
40 Council Regulation 2913/92, Art 123, O.J. 19.10.92 L302/1.
41 Ibid Art 86; see also ibid Art 123. As to outward processing, see below.
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where the products are not reimported into the Community within
the period prescribed.42
The second variation is equivalent compensation. Under special
conditions, the compensating products intended to be exported may
be obtained from equivalent Community goods instead of import
goods.43   As an exception to the general rules on inward
processing, this is interpreted restrictively.44 The equivalent goods
must be of the same quality, have the same technical
characteristics as the import goods and fall within the same eight-
digit subheading of the combined nomenclature code.45
Exceptionally, however, equivalent goods may be at a more
advanced stage of manufacture than the import goods, provided
that the essential part of the processing to which the equivalent
goods are subject is carried out in the undertaking of the holder of
the authorisation or in the undertaking where the operation is being
carried out on its behalf.46
                                  
42 Ibid Art 127.
43 Council Regulation (EC) 2913/92, Art 115(1)(a), O.J. 19.10.92 L302/1 . See
also ibid  Art 114(2)(e).
44Case C-103/96, Directeur Général des Douanes et Droits Indirects v
Eridiania Beghin-Say SA, [1997] ECR I-1453.
45 Council Regulation 2913/92, Art 115(2), OJ 19.10.92 L302/1. See also
Commission Regulation 2454/93, Art 569(1), O.J. 11.10.93 L335/1, as
amended by Commission Regulation 3665/93, O.J. 31.12.93, L 335/1, which
adds the requirement that the goods must fall within the same eight-digit
subheading of the combined nomenclature. This requirement was upheld by
the Court of Justice in Case C-103/96, Directeur Général des Douanes et
Droits Indirects v Eridiania Beghin-Say SA,  [1997] ECR I-1453. Special
provisions laid out in Annex 78  may apply to goods  included in this Annex:
see Commission Regulation 2454/93, Art 569(2), O.J. 11.10.93 L253/1.
46 Council Regulation  2913/92, Art 115(2), O.J. 19.10.92 L302/1. See also
Commission Regulation 2454/93, Art 570(1), O.J. 11.10.93 L335/1.
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The third variation is prior exportation. The Customs Code allows
compensating goods to be exported from the Community before the
importation of the import goods.47 This is not possible however
under the drawback system,48 nor for authorisations to be issued on
the basis of certain economic conditions.49
The fourth variation is triangular traffic. As part of the prior
exportation system the customs authorities may allow the triangular
traffic system.50 This system allows the import goods to be entered
for the inward processing procedure in the Community at a customs
office other than the one at which the prior exportation of the
compensating products took place.51
                                  
47 Council Regulation 2913/92, Art 115(1)(b), O.J. 19.10.92 L302/1. The
customs authorities shall indicate the period within which the non-Community
goods must be declared for the procedure taking account of the time required
for the procurement and transport to the Community of the import goods. See
ibid Art 118(3); see also Commission Regulation 2454/93, Art 561(1), O.J.
11.10.93 L253/1.As a general rule this period must not exceed six months,
but it may be extended if the holder of the authorisation submits a reasoned
request, provided that the total period does not exceed twelve months. See
ibid Art 561(2). Special rules apply to specific products, such as goods
subject to a price regulating mechanism (Art 561(2)) and raw sugar (Art
561(2)).
48 Ibid Art 126.
49Commission Regulation  2454/93, Art 572(1), OJ 11.10.93 L253/1, as
amended by Commission Regulation 3665/93, O.J. 31.12.93, L 335/1. As to
the economic conditions which do not allow for the possibility of prior
exportation under the suspension system, see Commission Regulation
2454/93, Art 552, OJ 11.10.93 L253/1, as amended.
50 Commission Regulation 2454/93, Art 600, OJ 11.10.93 L253/1. Triangular
traffic system is only possible as part of the prior exportation system.
51 Ibid, Art 549(i). As to the details of the triangular traffic system, se   ibid,
Art 575(3); see also ibid Article 601, as amended by Commission Regulation
3665/93, O.J. 31.12.93, L 335/1.  See also Commission Regulation 2454/93,
Arts 602-605, OJ 11.10.93 L253/1. Art 603 has been amended by
Commission Regulation (EC) No 2193/94, O.J. 9.9.94 L235/6.
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Outward processing, as defined in EC law, is the system whereby
Community goods may be exported temporarily from the customs
territory of the Community in order to undergo processing
operations and the compensating products resulting from those
operations be released for free circulation with total or partial relief
from import duties and non-tariff common commercial policy
measures.52 The purpose of this mechanism is to avoid the levying
of customs duty on goods exported from the Commmunity for
processing.53 This procedure may apply to all Community goods
other than those whose export gives rise to repayment or remission
of import duties, or which prior to export were released for free
circulation with total relief from import duties by virtue of end use,
for as long as the conditions from granting such relief continue to
apply, or whose export gives rise to the granting of export refunds
or in respect of which a financial advantage other than such refunds
                                  
52 Article 145(1) Council Regulation (EC) 2913/92, O. J. 19.10.92 L302/1; See
also Article 160 Ibid. See also Case 49/82 Commission of the European
Communities v. Kingdom of the Netherlands [1983] ECR 1195. As to the
specific conditions for the application of economic outward processing
arrangements to textiles and clothing listed in Chapters 50 to 63 of the
Combined Nomenclature and resulting from outward processing operations,
see Council Regulation (EC) No 3036/94, O.J. 15.12. 94 L322/1. See also
Council Regulation (EC) No 1385/94, O.J. 18.6.94 L152/4 (opening and
providing for the administration of Community tariff quotas for frozen hake
fillets and for processing work in respect of certain textile products under
Community outward processing arrangements). Allowed processing
operations under the outward processing procedure are: a) the working of
goods, including erecting or assembling them or fitting them to other goods;
b) the processing of goods; 3) the repair of goods, including restoring them
and putting them in order. See Article 145(3)(b) Council Regulation 2913/92,
OJ 19.10.92 L302/1; see also Article 114(2)(c) Ibid.
53 See Case C-16/91, Wacker Werke GmbH & Co. KG v. Hauptzollamt
Munchen-West, [1992] ECR I-6821.
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is granted under the common agricultural policy by virtue of the
export of the said goods.54
The EC inward processing arrangements (and, one assumes,
outward processing arrangements) are themselves subject to
international agreements, such as the International Dairy
Agreement, concluded by the Community as part of the GATT.55
Both inward processing and outward processing are also
governed by the International Convention on the Simplification and
Harmonization of Customs Procedures, signed at Kyoto on 18 May
1973.56 The Convention entered into force for the EC on 26
September 1974. Annex E.6 of the Convention concerns temporary
admission for inward processing. It entered into force on 6
December 1977, and, subject to certain reservations, it entered into
force for the EEC on the same date. Annex E.8 deals with
temporary exportation for outward processing. It entered into force
for the EEC, with certain reservations, on 20 April 1978.It may be
noted that China is a signatory to the International Convention on
                                  
54 Article 146 Council Regulation 2913/92, OJ 19.10.92 L302/1.
55 Products brought into the Community under the inward processing
arrangement are considered to be imported and exported for the purposes of
the International Dairy Agreement  (IDA) or any international trade
agreement. Consequently, Community legislation does not allow
authorisations for products for inward processing at a value below the
minimum prices set by the IDA: see Case C-61/94  Commission of the
European Communities v Federal Republic of Germany, [1996] ECR I-3989,
paragraphs 22-27.
56 See World Customs Organization, Handbook: International Convention on
the Simplification and Harmonization of Customs Procedures (Kyoto, 18 May
1973), 1st edition October 1975, Amending Supplement No. 13, January 1993
available on the internet at the website
<http://www.wcoomd.org/frmpublic.htm>.
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the Simplification and Harmonization of Customs Procedures
signed at Kyoto, but has not yet accepted the Annexes.57
5. IPT and OPT in the European Court of Justice
Global economic networks do not correspond in their geographical
reach to national or EC political and legal boundaries. Partly as a
result, they tend to generate  disputes which sometimes take the
form of very complex litigation. Before examining some such anti-
dumping cases, however, this section focuses on a selection of
relatively simple cases before the European Court of Justice (ECJ).
They provide a useful introduction to IPT/OPT disputes, because
they suggest what types of disputes arise, illustrate the basic legal
concepts, and show how the ECJ has dealt, explicitly or implicitly,
with global economic networks.
In Case 49/82 Commission v Netherlands,58 the Commission
brought an Article 169 action against the Netherlands for
authorising the packing in small packages of butter imported from
third countries and stored in customs warehouses.  It argued, in
essence, that this kind of packing was not the simple operation of a
‘usual form of handling’ as required for the use of the customs
warehousing procedure. The customs warehousing procedure
provides for the storage in a customs warehouse in the EU of
                                  
57 The Convention entered into force for China on 9 August 1988. China has
accepted only Annex E.3 concerning customs warehouses and Annex F.5
concerning urgent consignments.
58 [1983] ECR 1195.
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goods, either from the EU or from a third country, free of customs
duty. The Commission considered that the operation in this case
called instead for the use of the inward processing procedure.
Goods imported under the inward processing procedure were
reserved solely for export, were subject to more stringent controls to
protect Community producers, and had to comply with more formal
requirements. In addition, during the period in question the use of
the inward processing procedure had been temporarily suspended
in order to encourage EC processors of butter for export to use
surplus EC butter rather than third country butter. Even in normal
circumstances, therefore, customs warehousing would have given
the importer or processor greater commercial freedom of choice
and would have been lower in cost. But in the specific
circumstances of the case, the authorisation by the Netherlands of
the customs warehousing procedure also enabled Dutch
processing enterprises to avoid an agricultural levy payable on the
release for consumption of butter imported from third countries.
Detailed harmonised rules concerning inward processing were then
not yet in force in the Community, and the Netherlands had in fact
followed its previous national practice. Advocate-General  Slynn
pointed out, however, that
'[t]he dividing line [between customs warehousing and
inward processing] is not entirely clear. None the less it
seems to me that where the goods are shown to have
been brought into the Community with the intention that
they may be processed, and then re-exported, rather
40
than for the essential purpose of storage with incidental
handling, they ought to be dealt with under the inward
processing system'.59
He also identified a need for harmonisation because of the
existence of different national provisions as to what operations were
regarded as inward processing or as customs warehousing.60
The European Court of Justice, following its Advocate-General,
held that the operation in question did not come within the scope of
the customs warehousing procedure and was therefore covered by
the inward processing procedure, as defined in Article 2 of Council
Directive 69/73 on the harmonisation of provisions laid down by
law, regulation or administrative action in respect of inward
processing.61 The judgment implicitly affirmed the power of the ECJ
to decide on the classification of such import transactions.
Harmonisation by the judiciary could substitute at least provisionally
for harmonisation by the legislator. Such judicial empowerment
itself was part of the europeanisation of law, in both the institutional
and normative terms. In its judgment the ECJ  also re-affirmed the
pre-eminence of EC law, which was then being elaborated. Diverse
national practices could not be allowed to undermine common EC
policies, such as the Common Agricultural Policy, or impede the
eventual development of harmonised EC customs law. In normative
terms, the case also clarified the distinction between customs
warehousing and inward processing. Customs warehousing could
                                  
59 [1983] ECR 1195 at 1213.
60 [1983] ECR 1195 at 1212.
61 OJ Eng. Spec.Ed. 1969, (I), p 75.
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be used only for very simple procedures, whereas certain types of
packaging, as well as more complex procedures, required the use
of inward processing.
Seen from a broader perspective, the case demonstrated that the
boundary between inward processsing and customs warehousing
would in the last instance be policed, if necessary, by the ECJ.
Patrolling this boundary represented a way of managing the
complex relationship between globalisation and europeanisation. In
the specific circumstances of the case, the ECJ gave priority to
protecting the EC’s financial interests and EC producers; these may
be some meanings of europeanisation, though certainly not the only
ones. At the same time, it urged the EC legislator, that is, the
Member States, to adopt harmonised rules to manage on a more
coherent, less ad hoc and more long-term basis the problematic
relationship between europeanisation and globalisation: in other
words, to adopt a europeanised solution to certain problems posed
by economic globalisation.
Outward processing has been the subject of several ECJ
judgments. Most involve German companies, which should not be
surprising in view of the early internationalisation of German firms
and the importance of OPT between Germany and central and
eastern European countries. An early case was Case 118/79
Gebrueder Knauf Westdeutsche Gipswerke v Haupzollamt
Hamburg-Jonas.62 It concerned exports of maize starch authorised
under German OPT legislation, and reimported into the EC as
                                  
62 [1980] ECR 1183.
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compensating products manufactured from that starch and
intended for the building sector. At the time there was no EC OPT
legislation. For this reason, OPT was not subject to permanent
customs supervision. In other words, there was no system of
Community control ensuring the re-importation of the products
exported under national outward processing arrangements. As
pointed out by the Commission in the case, OPT was attractive for
EC enterprises because of the lower production costs of third
country undertakings63 but in the absence of EC control of re-
imports, this could result in disturbance of the markets of third
countries and also led to shortages on EC markets.
The Court of Justice was asked to interpret the concept of 'export'
within the meaning of Article 7(2) of Regulation (EEC) 1132/74 on
production refunds in the cereals and rice sectors.64 It held that this
concept must be interpreted to mean that any levy which may be
introduced in pursuance of that provision must also be imposed on
the exportation of the products in question when they are exported
under outward processing arrangements and later re-imported as
compensating products. In other words, products exported for OPT
under national law remained subject to export levies imposed by
Community law.
As a result of this judgment, not only did EC law complement
national law; the footprint of EC law left its mark on national law.
Even in the absence of EC OPT legislation, Member States’
                                  
63 [1980] ECR 1183 at 1187.
64  See Council Regulation 1132/74, OJ 10.5.74 L128/24.
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attempts to control and capture the fruits of economic globalisation
could not escape the financial consequences of  europeanisation,
even though europeanisation had occurred in other spheres and
not yet with regard to OPT.  In this case, EC export levies served as
an ex ante substitute for the ex post controls which would have
been available under EC OPT legislation. The case  illustrates the
overlap and conflict of different national and EC legislation in the
period before the europeanisation of the outward processing
procedure. The ECJ was the arbiter of competition between the EC
and the Member States about who should govern economic
globalisation and to what extent.
A second OPT case was Case C-292/91 Gebrueder Weis GmbH v
Hauptzolllamt Wuerzburg.65 It concerned the post-clearance
recovery of customs duties on import. Fabrics originating i ter alia
in Portugal had been sent to Yugoslavia for the production of men's
outer garments and then returned to the Community. Article 15 of
the 1980 EEC-Yugoslavia Cooperation Agreement66 provided inter
alia that industrial products originating in Yugoslavia ‘...shall be
imported into the Community free of quantitative restrictions and
measures having equivalent effect, and of customs duties and
charges having equivalent effect'.  Article 30 of the Agreement
provided that 'products originating in the Community' are to be
considered 'products originating in Yugoslavia' on condition that
they have undergone in Yugoslavia working or processing which is
not 'insufficient' within the meaning of Article 3(3) of Protocol 3 of
                                  
65 [1993] ECR I-2219.
66 OJ 14.2.83 1983 L41/2.
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the Agreement. The defendant customs authority decided to levy
customs duties on the ground that, in the context of the transitional
scheme applicable to products originating in Portugal, according to
which goods traded between Portugal and the other Member States
were subject to residual customs duties, the fabrics in question
were not to be regarded as 'originating in the Community'.
The Court of Justice held, however, that such customs duties were
not recoverable where the importer had observed all the applicable
provisions as regards the customs declaration and where any error
as regards the categorisation as Community goods or not of goods
originating in Portugal would have been far from detectable from a
mere reading of the provisions in force by a normally experienced
trader. In other words, the ECJ reaffirmed its institutional
interpretative role, it applied a test of reasonableness, and in
economic terms it gave the trader the benefit of the doubt. The ECJ
favoured the market by allowing traders in these circumstances to
rely on their business experience. L x mercatoria prevailed, and
money accrued neither to the EC as own resources, nor to the
national customs administration which would otherwise have
received 10% of the duties to cover the cost of collection. The
judgment also favoured economic globalisation by lowering the
operating costs of transnational economic networks and OPT.
Case C-16/91 Wacker Werke GmbH & Co KG v Hauptzollamtt
Muenchen-West67 exemplified the connection between inward
processing and outward processing and the potential for abuse of
                                  
67 [1992] ECR I-6821.
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the system. The case was an Article 177 reference for a preliminary
ruling on the interpretation of Council Regulation 2473/86 on
outward processing relief arrangements and the standard exchange
system.68 The proceedings concerned the value for customs
purposes of certain products imported by the applicant Wacker
Werke between 1986 and 1988. Wacker Werke had purchased the
products from Wacker Corporation, established in the USA, with
which it had financial links.
Wacker Werke manufactured petrol engines and purchased diesel
engines from other undertakings in Germany. It then sold these two
types of engine to Wacker Corporation. The engines were exported
as temporary export goods under an authorisation issued on the
basis of the regulation on outward processing. When Wacker
Werke sold the engines to Wacker Corporation, it added, by way of
general expenses and profit margin, 25% of the cost of
manufacturing its petrol engines and 5% to the purchase price of
the diesel engines it purchased from other German undertakings.
Wacker Corporation incorporated these engines into vibration
plates, vibro-compacters and hydaulic pumps. It then sold these
products, partly on the American and European markets directly,
and partly to Wacker Werke, which reimported them into the
Community as compensating products under the outward
processing arrangements. Wacker Werke bought these
compensating products from Wacker Corporation at the prices
shown in the latter's price list for the American markets less a
reduction of 45%.
                                  
68 Council Regulation 2473/86, OJ 2.8.86 L212/1.
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The dispute between Wacker Werke and the German customs
authority concerned the valuation of the temporary export goods.
The OPT regulation allowed compensating products in an OPT
transaction to benefit on their release from free circulation in the EC
from partial or total relief from customs duties. Relief was to be
calculated by deducting from the amount of import duties applicable
to the compensating products [here, vibration plates, vibro-
compacters and hydaulic pumps] the amount of import duties that
would have been applicable to the temporary export goods [petrol
and diesel engines] if they were imported into the Community from
the country in which they underwent  the processing operation or
last such operation.
The essential issue was whether the 25% and 5% ‘uplift’ or
supplements added by the applicant should be taken into account.
The German national court, which referred the case to the ECJ,
stated that there was no evidence that the prices charged by
Wacker Werke for the temporary export goods, or those charged by
Wacker Corporation for the compensating products, were
influenced by the links between the two companies.69 However, the
German Government argued that 'all these factors [regarding
pricing] suggest a deliberate intention to set as high a value as
possible for the temporary export goods in order to keep the
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differential duty payable at a moderate level'.70 The essential
problem, in its view, was the evasion of duty by transfer pricing.71
The European Court of Justice held in this case, known as Wacker
Werke I, that the value of the temporary export goods corresponded
to the difference between the customs value of the compensating
products and the processing costs determined by reasonable
means, such as taking account of the transaction value of the
goods in question. As in Case 118/79 Gipswerke case, it adopted a
reasonableness test, gave the benefit of doubt to the company, and
respected the decision of the market. In other words, the applicant
company won. The judgment also facilitated OPT by lowering its
costs and encouraged the use of the outward processing procedure
as part of the calculations of a translatlantic economic network.
Following the ECJ ruling, the Finanzgericht upheld Wacker Werke's
application.
The German customs authority appealed the judgment. It argued
that the judgment conferred unjustified customs advantages on the
trader. The case was then again referred for a preliminary ruling to
the ECJ as Case C-142/96 Hauptzollamt Muenchen v Wacker
Werke GmbH & Co KG [Wacker Werke II].72 The European Court
of  Justice, once again following Advocate-General Tesauro held
that reference to the transaction value of the temporary import
                                  
70 See the Report for the Hearing, [1992] ECR I-6821 at I-6829.
71 As to transfer pricing as a regulatory issue, see Sol Picciotto,‘Transfer
Pricing and the Antinomies of Corporate Regulation’, in Joseph McCahery,
Sol Picciotto, and Colin Scott (eds), Corporate Control and Accountability:
Changing Structures and the Dynamics of Regulation (Clarendon Press,
Oxford, 1993), pp 375-405.
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goods was a reasonable means of determining processing costs. In
determining the transaction value, reference could be made to the
purchase price, inclusive of uplifts, even if this resulted in a higher
rate of duty for the unprocessed goods than for the compensating
products.73
With regard to the possibility of transfer pricing, the ECJ stated that
the possibility of ‘tariff anomalies’, and the consequent financial
advantages for traders, were risks that were inherent in the outward
processing procedure. These risks were outweighed, however, by
the benefits of OPT. The ECJ held that the merits or demerits of
individual cases had to be accepted, provided that there was no
evidence to indicate the inter-firm prices were influenced by their
business links, or even by the fact that the ‘inter-firm’ prices were
even ‘intra-firm’ in the sense of belonging to a single, tightly knit
global economic network.74 Such an approach might seem to give
more weight to legal form than to economic reality in the sense of
the practical operation of economic networks. But the ECJ
judgment also entailed that the existence of transfer pricing among
related enterprises was a question of fact to be decided by the
national court. National judges therefore have the task of evaluating
and supervising the financial arrangements of firms which litigate
before them. Such a norm itself, though perhaps continuing
previous national practices, is a form of europeanisation: it
represents a jurisdiction marker between different courts that is laid
down by the ECJ. In the absence of any such finding, the ECJ
                                                                                                  
72 [1997] ECR I-4649.
73 [1997] ECR I-4649 at 4668 [paragraph 22].
74 [1997] ECR I-4969 at 4649 [paragraph 21].
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judgment also signalled a policy preference for encouraging OPT
and creating economic incentives for the development of global
economic networks.
Another case involving IPT and OPT was Case C-103/96 Eridania
Beghin-Say.75 The ECJ was asked to give a preliminary ruling on
the validity of a regulation that made recourse to inward processing
arrangements with
equivalent compensation subject to the condition that the
equivalent goods must fall within the same subheading of the
Common Customs Tariff as the
imported goods. The basic issue was the compatibility of the
regulation with the basic EC law principles of legitimate
expectations and legal certainty. The ECJ concluded that, in the
circumstances of the case, a trader could not have any legitimate
expectation other than being able to have recourse to equivalent
compensation where the goods concerned fall within the same
subheading under the nomenclature in force at the material time.
This was because the availability of equivalent compensation
depended on a criterion forming part of another set of rules, namely
the tariff classification of specific goods, which were liable to vary
as a result of periodic changes. The possibility of such changes
was foreseeable This fact barred the creation of a legitimate
expectation with regard to the inward processing procedure.
The case illustrates the interconnection and hierarchy between
different sets of customs rules. The ECJ subordinated those
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concerning inward processing to those concerning tariff
classification; classification, valuation, and origin, which constitute
the basic skeleton of all EU customs law.76 The inward processing
procedure makes sense only within this normative framework. Its
existence, as already noted, is due precisely to such normative
trade barriers, whether in the EU or elsewhere. In more general
terms, the ECJ judgment reaffirmed the primacy of eur peanisation
over globalisation. In so far as inward processing may be seen to
represent globalisation, the ECJ considered that, for EU-based
traders, it could only take place within the normative framework of
EC law. Globalisation, in other words, was subject to European
integration.
6. IPT, OPT and Anti-Dumping
The interrelationship between IPT, OPT, and anti-dumping involves
more complicated disputes and exemplifies the increasingly
complex - and increasingly problematic - relationship between
globalisation and europeanisation. IPT and OPT is frequently
involved in EC anti-dumping investigations and litigation concerning
global economic networks. It may in fact be suggested that the
development of global economic networks is an important factor in
recent changes in EU anti-dumping law and practice,77 hough this
hypothesis remains to be tested.78 Here it is not possible to present
a full picture of the intersection of IPT, OPT, and anti-dumping; a
thorough substantive analysis must wait until later. The following
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paragraphs are intended simply to indicate some of the different
scenarios that have arisen in practice.
In many anti-dumping cases, downstream EU users of the allegedly
dumped imports argue that the imposition of anti-dumping duties
will threaten their exports from the EU to third countries so should
not be imposed. They appeal in this way not only to commercial
rationality but also to virtually patriotic (in a double sense) notions of
enhancing EC trade, or at least not damaging the EC balance of
payments. Such arguments, however, are rarely successful.
Instead, anti-dumping duties are imposed, and the downstream
users are required to source materials to produce their exports by
using the more restricted inward processing procedure.
The Extramet saga concerned imports of calcium metal from China
and the then Soviet Union. In January 1988 the Chambre Syndicale
de l'Electrométallurgie et de l'Electrochimie made a complaint on
behalf of the sole Community producer, namely Péchiney
Electrométallurgie, which accounted for the entire EC calcium
metal production. Extramet Industrie was the main EC importer. Its
activity consisted partly in granulating calcium metal.  It accounted
for between 62% and 97% of aggregate imports of calcium metal
from China and Russia into the EC. The Chinese exporter was the
China Nuclear Energy Industry Corporation (CNEIC), the trading
arm of the sole producer of calcium metal in China, China National
Nuclear Corporation (CNNC). Extramet argued that it had no
source of supply other than China and Russia, because the sole EC
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manufacturer either had high prices or refused to supply.
The Commission investigation led eventually to the imposition of
definitive anti-dumping duties.79  Extramet’s application of interim
measures was dismissed.80 However, its action for annulment was
declared admissible,81 and subsequently the ECJ declared the anti-
dumping measure void.82 Subsequent complaints led to a new
investigation. This resulted in turn in the imposition of a new
provisional anti-dumping duty83 and then a new definitive anti-
dumping duty.84 Once again Extramet, now trading as Industries
des Poudres Sphériques (IPS) brought an application for interim
measures. As before, the action was unsuccessful.85
In evaluating the results of its investigation, the Commission
assessed the possible impact of eventual measures on primary
users. They included processors such as IPS, and user industries,
such as the lead and ferro-alloy industry and the steel industry. The
latter argued that the imposition of anti-dumping duties would
disrupt their exports. However, the Commission concluded, inter
alia, that for their sales of processed calcium metal outside the EC,
these firms could continue to derive their inputs from Russia or
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China under the inward processing arrangements without paying
any duty.
Similarly, when IPS applied for interim measures, the Council
argued that, if interim measures were adopted, they should be
conditional, inter alia, on the establishment of a mechanism to
prevent IPS from reselling the goods imported from China and
Russia without processing in the EU. This was intended to ensure
that, if IPS were granted interim measures in respect of anti-
dumping, it did not also circumvent the restrictions on IPT which
were intended to protect EU producers. This demand raises several
larger issues which, for reasons of space, can only be mooted here.
For example, what is the relationship between IPT and anti-
dumping? What are their respective roles in the international
division of labour and the restructuring of industry? To what extent
are domestic EU producers protected by anti-dumping measures if
their competitors have recourse to IPT? Are anti-dumping
measures and IPT to some extent contradictory? What contribution,
if any, does each make to the building of the EU in the age of
globalisation? In this case, the ECJ dismissed the IPS application.
A second example concerns imports of silicon metal from China.86
China was by far the world’s biggest supplier of silicon metal. The
main EU users of the imports were producers of aluminium.  In
1995 the Comité de Liaison des Industries de Ferro-Alliages
(CLIFA) lodged a request for a review on behalf of four Community
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producers, which allegedly represented a major proportion of the
total EU silicon metal production. The Commission then initiated an
expiry review of the anti-dumping measures that were then in place
on silicon metal from China. Five Chinese exporters replied to the
questionnaire sent as part of the Commission investigation. All
were represented by the China Chamber of Commerce for Import
and Export of Metals, Minerals & Chemicals (CCCMC). During the
investigation it emerged that some of the main Community
importers might be related to the exporters, as part of State-
controlled 'Minemetals` import and export network.
In the past more than two-thirds of China’s silicon metal exports
had usually gone to Japan. As Japanese and other Asian markets
became saturated, Chinese production declined.  With the lapse of
the EC and USA anti-dumping measures then in force, or at least
so EC producers argued in this case, Chinese producers could
regain the previous high level of production and increase exports to
the EU. On the contrary, a UK aluminium producers association
argued that anti-dumping measures would damage the international
competitive position of EC products. The Commission accepted the
former argument. It dismissed the latter on the ground that silicon
metal used for the production in the EU of aluminium for export
could enter the EU without duty under the inward processing
procedure.  In 1997 the Council imposed a definitive anti-dumping
duty.87
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A third example concerns ferro-silico-manganese (FeSiMn) from
China. FeSiMn is used in the steel industry for deoxidization and as
an alloy. It is mainly produced from manganese ore and silicon,
which are mixed together and brought to fusion temperatures in a
furnace. The main downstream user is the steel industry. The
original complaint, which also concerned other importing countries,
came from EuroAlliages, the association representing the
Community producers of ferro-silico-manganese; the latter were
located in Belgium, France, Spain, and Italy. On the other side, the
Commission received comments from two user associations and
one user.
The users stated that the imposition of an anti-dumping duty would
cause a significant increase in the cost of production of steel
products. They also argued that it could also endanger the
competitiveness of the EC stainless steel industry on the world
market. However, the Commission concluded that FeSiMn needed
for the production of exports could enter the EU under the inward
processing regime without any duty; one user was in fact using this
regime to import FeSiMn from South Africa. The Council in 1998
imposed a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of Chinese
FeSiMn.88
The EU institutions were concerned here to maintain the integrity
both of anti-dumping measures to protect certain EU producers and
of inward processing as a separate but restricted channel for
imports for processing for export by other EU producers. The case
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illustrates, thus, the potentially contradictory roles of anti-dumping
and the inward processing procedure. It also exemplifies the
different roles assumed by each procedure concerning the role of
the EU in global economic networks. The assumption underlying
regular imports and anti-dumping measures is that the EU is the
final destination of the products. Under IPT, however, the EU
serves as simply a node in a global economic network or as a
processing site.
To what extent are these different assumptions compatible, at least
to the extent to which the firms using each import channel
compete? The issue arose with regard to handbags from China.
Large European firms control the major designs and thus access to
the market. Subcontractors do the work of producing handbags,
which is labour-intensive. Chinese and EU producers tend to
compete for the contracts. In China handbags are produced under
Chinese inward processing arrangements, and thus under outward
processing arrangements as seen from the EU. These IPT/OPT
arrangements involve global economic networks; large EU firms
may establish a Hong Kong subsidiary, which rents factory space
and hires workers for production in China. In the EU handbags are
produced mainly by SMEs, especially from the southern Member
States. Chinese producers dominate the EU market for plastic
handbags.  The fiercest competition thus concerns contracts for the
production of leather handbags.
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In 1997 the Commission imposed a provisional anti-dumping duty
on plastic and leather handbags from China.89 Indonesia was
chosen as an analogue country. In calculating normal value, the
Commission considered that, with regard to raw materials, there
were no significant differences between Indonesian producers and
the Chinese producers that co-operated in the investigation. Both
obtained most of their raw material on the international market
under inward processing arrangements. The Commission also
considered that the imposition of anti-dumping duties would not
harm the exports of handbags by EU firms to China, since such
exports were minimal due to the high Chinese customs duties. It
should be noted, however, that global economic networks operated
mainly outside this channel of trade and instead through OPT and
IPT arrangements, in both the EU and China.
The Commission investigation revealed that a number of EC
manufacturers had already moved part of their production to China.
These manufacturers, which did not cooperate in the investigation,
argued that the imposition of anti-dumping measures would reduce
employment in their EC factories. Such measures would make it
impossible to cross-subsidise the manufacture of low- volume,
high-priced handbags in the EC with high-volume, low-priced
imports of handbags from China. Some producers, mainly in
Germany and the UK, were in fact able to maintain a small EC
production by achieving higher profit margins on handbags
imported from China. The Commission pointed out that, even if
anti-dumping duties were imposed, these firms would still be able to
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source handbags from China. The Commission also considered
whether the imposition of anti-dumping duties would hinder EC
exports of raw materials for handbags to be produced in China. It
concluded, however, that the majority of Chinese manufacturers
sourced the accessories in Asia, mostly in China itself, but also in
Taiwan and Korea. It is worth noting that all of sampled EC
producers visited by the Commission in the anti-dumping
investigation purchased their raw materials and accessories from
EC suppliers.
 In 1997 the Council imposed a definite anti-dumping duty on
leather handbags alone.90 This was a compromise, especially
between the northern and the southern Member States. Viewed in
general terms, these two groups reflected the interests of global
economic networks and EU SMEs, respectively. The Council
compromise recognised the dominance of global economic
networks, including Chinese producers, in the EU market for plastic
handbags. It also served, at least provisionally, to protect the mainly
SME EU producers of leather handbags. This EU institutional
strategy aims to manage the conflicts and contradictions between
globalisation and europeanisation by separating global and
domestic markets, and trying to insulate each from the other, at
least temporarily and so far as possible. Whether it is feasible, and
for how long, remains to be seen.
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7. Conclusion
Europeanisation and globalisation are both friends and rivals.  EU
law is an expression, a means, and an outcome of europeanisation.
At the same time certain aspects of EU law, such as the inward
processing and outward processing customs procedures, respond
to and encourage the development of global economic networks,
which are among the basic features of economic globalisation. EU
law thus is an integral part of global economic networks. But these
networks have contradictory effects on the EU and its Member
States,  tending both to strengthen and to fragment and partly
restructure them as political organisations and polities.
Europeanisation and globalisation thus are complementary, partly
overlapping,  mutually reinforcing, but also competing processes.
This paper has emphasised the symbiotic development of global
economic networks and EU international trade and customs law. It
has also pointed to some present or eventual contradictions
between the two. But the implications of the argument are not
limited to external relations or trade. The demand for the
constitutionalisation of governance in the EU stems partly from the
impact and implications of globalisation; this is exemplified by
economic and monetary union.91. At the same time globalisation
sustains and creates interests and relationships which undercut
traditional constitutionalistion as a mode of EU governance. The
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ECJ Opinion 1/94 WTO92 and its judgment in Hermès93 can be
used to support both of these points.
 EU law thus is at war with itself. It embodies and reflects conflicting
interests and thus, partly for this reason, comprises contradictory
strands. This is more true of the EU than the Member States’ legal
systems because of the dimension of scale. Its implications are
more far-reaching for the EU than for a Member State (though for
Member States the implications of globalisation are also profound),
in particular because the EU is relatively new, lacking in legitimacy,
and in search of its basic values. Certain aspects of EU law, which
are oriented to and foster globalisation, tend to undercut the
influence of other aspects of EU law, which might otherwise lead to
a stronger, more coherent process of europeanisation. This gives
the processes of globalisation and europeanisation an especially
complex character. These assertions may seem surprising if our
reading of reality is limited only to processes and consequently
neglects the interests and structures which underlie them. An
understanding of these interests and structures is essential,
however, if we are to grasp the complex interaction of globalisation
and europeanisation. It is even more important if we wish to
imagine a different way of constitutionalising EU governance in the
age of global economic networks and other forms of globalisation.
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